চলতি ২০১১-১২ অর্থবছরের প্রথম মাস অর্থাৎ জুলাই মাসে দেশে পণ্য আমদানির জন্য ঋণপত্র খোলার পরিমাণ কমে গেছে।
বাংলাদেশ ব্যাংকের পরিসংখ্যান থেকে দেখা যায়, চলতি বছর জুলাই মাসে ব্যাংকগুলোয় পণ্য আমদানির জন্য প্রায় ২৭৭ কোটি ২২ লাখ ডলারের ঋণপত্র খোলা হয়েছিল। আর গত বছর জুলাই মাসে পণ্য আমদানির ঋণপত্র খোলার পরিমাণ ছিল ৩০০ কোটি ডলার।
অর্থাৎ, গত বছরের জুলাই মাসের তুলনায় চলতি বছর জুলাই মাসে পণ্য আমদানির জন্য ঋণপত্র খোলার হার সাড়ে সাত শতাংশ কমে গেছে।
অন্যদিকে জুলাই মাসে নিষ্পত্তিকৃত ঋণপত্রের পরিমাণ ছিল ২৬৩ কোটি ৭০ লাখ ডলার, যা এর আগের বছরের একই সময়ের চেয়ে প্রায় ২৬ শতাংশ বেশি।
২০১০ সালের জুলাই মাসে পণ্য আমদানির জন্য খোলা ঋণপত্র থেকে ২০৯ কোটি ৬১ লাখ ডলারের ঋণপত্র নিষ্পত্তি হয়েছিল।
বাংলাদেশ ব্যাংকের পরিসংখ্যান থেকে আরও দেখা যায়, এ বছর আগস্ট মাসের প্রথম সপ্তাহে পণ্য আমদানির জন্য বিভিন্ন ব্যাংকে মোট ৪৩ কোটি ৭৯ লাখ ডলারের ঋণপত্র খোলা হয়েছে। মূলত রমজান ও ঈদ সামনে রেখে বিভিন্ন পণ্য আমদানির জন্য ঋণপত্র খোলার প্রবণতা এই সময়ে বেড়েছে।
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There are at least three elements in the process of actualising the benefits from a stronger regional transport connectivity including provisions of transit. These are, first, the political guidance; second, the technical preparation or the so-called homework; and third, the negotiations for deciding the terms of engagement of the concerned parties.
The political decision, expressed through the Joint Communiqué announced during the visit of Bangladesh's prime minister to India in February 2010, has been in the right direction. Regrettably, subsequent disparate statements from high-level representatives of the Bangladesh government have only added to the confusion, to say the least, surrounding the complex subject of connectivity and transit. Surprisingly, the concerned issues although being debated in public, never became an agenda item either in parliament or in the associated parliamentary standing committees. Indeed, the cabinet never took it up for policy discussion either.
Regarding technical preparations, there had been some progress through the works of the committees set up under the auspices of the Bangladesh Tariff Commission. The outputs of these committees (considered classified documents, though reported in media) are yet to be validated through detailed discussions with broader cross-sections of domestic stakeholders, including the concerned segments of the private sector (e.g. trucking agencies). Curiously, the stances taken by the technical committees are often publicly overruled by individual members of the government.
On the third element, I am not fully aware of how the negotiations are being carried out. Usually, political guidance and technical works come together during the negotiation process. Rather, one is surprised to note that certain aspects of the transit negotiations are being discretely pushed forward leaving the basic framework issues unresolved. An attempt to have an early “agreement” for the use of Chittagong and Mongla ports is a case in point. One is not aware of whether the government has set up a fully endowed -- politically and professionally -- negotiating group to service the tasks in hand.
The evolving negotiation process usually gets captured in bilateral or plurilateral documents reflecting the level of mutual understanding. For example, once a political understanding is reached, it is then transformed into a document elaborating the objectives, modalities, scope and dispute-resolution mechanism. These aspects are usually contained in a framework agreement, if not in a treaty. One may follow this up with dedicated protocols for specific modes of transport or transit/transshipment routes. Curiously, the government representatives often talk about issues which are part of the standard operating procedures, while the “framework issues” remain wide open. The missing elements in the hierarchy of official records of Indo-Bangla relationship possibly depict the non-coherent approach that is being practised.
We are aware that Bangladesh may potentially gain from its engagement in regional connectivity framework, particularly by securing access through India to Nepal and Bhutan. However, given the sensitivities underpinning the process, the country's economic benefits have to be “visibly” more so as to justify the costs involved. The cost-benefit analysis is warranted not only in financial term, but also in economic and social terms. Thus, while estimating for capital investments we would need to account for the alternative demand for these resources, while determining the requisition price of land one has to account for its shadow price in a land scarce and food insecure country, and we should not forget the negative spillovers in the areas of congestion, environment and ecology. That is why the methodology for deriving the cost and benefit estimates are so important. Regrettably, there is no transparency regarding the methodology that is being applied for estimating the transit fees.
But various estimates of transit fees are being reported in the media. For example, the core committee on transit has estimated the fee for road transport is 7 cents per tonne per kilometre and suggested that this figure should be topped-up during negotiations. In any negotiation one starts with numbers reflecting high-level of ambitions in anticipation that they will be brought down through bargaining. We are possibly an exception as we estimate “base number”, not the “asking number”. This is all because there is yet to be any official guidance regarding Bangladesh's possible claim (in whatever way) on the “avoided costs” by the Indian counterparts so the base estimates have been calculated by only accounting for the “incremental cost” of transit traffic.
It is also interesting that if we decide even today on a transit fee for the transit goods, it will take at least 4-5 years for a vehicle to travel seamlessly from one point to another. This is because we have important missing links in the transport infrastructure. The most critical of them includes Akhaura-Agartala and Mongla-Khulna railway as well as Dhaka-Chittagong and Dhaka-Tangail four (six) lane highway. Bangabandhu Bridge is also not capable of taking extra load. However, transshipment is possible as it is happening now through Ashuganj. Regrettably, during the last one and a half years, not a single project has been launched to patch up these missing links using the conditional line of credit of $1 billion, provided by India.
Most troubling is the fact that instead of consolidating the negotiation process, the Bangladesh government has flipped-flopped its policy stances which have prejudiced our future negotiations. An example relates to water transit which has been there for quite some time. On this account, the Bangladesh government receives a paltry amount of Tk 5.5 crore annually towards operation and maintenance of the waterways and the operating vessels pay various charges, but no transit fee. Last year, the finance ministry imposed a transit fee of Tk 10,000 per container and Tk 1,000 per tonne of transit goods. But these transit fees had to be withdrawn subsequently as great pressure was brought to bear on the finance ministry.
I strongly believe that it is a development imperative for Bangladesh to play a pivotal role in developing a regional multimodal transport network that goes beyond India, Nepal and Bhutan. Towards that end, the country needs to further clarify its political outlook, deepen socio-political ownership, improve technical preparations and strengthen negotiating stances. One should not rush the process without putting in place the necessary prerequisites for a successful outcome from such a potential initiative. Transport connectivity and transit provisions between Bangladesh and India as well as in the sub-region are alluding to a great development prospect. We need to address it properly so as to avoid new problems in our relationship with the neighbours.